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Trademark Protection in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Closer 
Look at Lubrizol and Its Progeny 
Endia Vereen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Filing a petition for bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a 
strenuous experience for any business. While the number of business bankruptcy 
filings has consistently fallen over the last four years, over 31,000 business 
bankruptcy cases were filed during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 
2014.1 Although bankruptcy helps businesses get a fresh start financially by 
protecting and rebuilding a troubled company, it can have alarming effects on the 
entities that do business with them. 
In the past decade, the value of patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade 
secrets has increased considerably, and a major portion of mergers, acquisitions, 
and partnerships involve the license or sale of intellectual property assets.2 
Intellectual property licensing is a vital component of business strategy, which 
creates a partnership between an intellectual property rights owner (licensor) and 
another who is authorized to use such rights (licensee) in exchange for an agreed-
upon fee.3 During these deals, companies are usually unwilling to transfer complete 
ownership of such valuable intangible assets. As a result, businesses of all sizes 
negotiate to procure licenses to use intellectual property, adding significant value 
and revenue to their own operations. 
                                                          
* J.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2015. The author would like to 
thank her family for their unwavering love and support, and all of the editors from the Journal of 
Technology Law & Policy for their contributions to this Note. 
1 U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2014, United States Courts (June 3, 
2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/ 
2014/0314_f2.pdf. 
2 LANNING G. BRYER & MELVIN SIMENSKY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS (2010). 
3 Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights; a Vital Component of the Business Strategy of Your 
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When the worlds of bankruptcy and intellectual property licenses converge, 
licensees are placed in potentially dangerous positions. Consider the following 
example: Entity A acquires an intellectual property license (licensee) from Entity B 
(licensor). Years later, Entity B becomes financially unstable and files a petition for 
bankruptcy. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, when a company files for 
bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to handle the company’s debts and finances.4 As 
such, the trustee for Entity B may assume or reject any executory contract of the 
debtor to free Entity B from burdensome financial obligations.5 If the licensing 
agreement between Entity A and Entity B is considered executory and the trustee 
rejects it, Entity A is left in a dangerous position where its right to continue using 
the licensed intellectual property could be limited or fully denied. 
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., is the seminal 
case on the issue of bankruptcy and intellectual property licenses.6 The case stands 
for the proposition that when a debtor licensor rejects an intellectual property 
license as “executory,” the licensee no longer has the right “to rely on provisions 
within the agreement with the debtor for continued use of the technology.” The 
licensee is then left with only the claims for damages that are still available to it 
under other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.7 The Lubrizol ruling was a 
significant blow to intellectual property licensees until Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code to protect certain technology licensees by allowing them to elect 
to retain limited rights to the intellectual property if the debtors or trustees rejected 
the licenses.8 However, Congress’ amendment of the Code purposely omitted 
trademarks from such protections. Thus, trademark licensees have no right to the 
protections granted to other forms of intellectual property under the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
This Note addresses the protection of trademark licensees when licensors 
enter bankruptcy proceedings. First, this Note will outline the history of intellectual 
property, including some of its most common forms. Second, it will discuss the 
Bankruptcy Code and the meaning of an executory contract. Third, it will discuss 
the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act and trademark protection 
specifically. Fourth, this Note will detail the circuit split created by Sunbeam 
Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing. Finally, this Note will focus 
                                                          
4 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012). 
5 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). 
6 Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
7 Id. at 1048. 
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on the implications of the circuit split and conclude by providing some suggestions 
for how courts can resolve this issue in the future. 
I. A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, 
AND TRADEMARKS 
Intellectual property is defined as “something (such as an idea, invention, or 
process) that comes from a person’s mind, and includes inventions, literary and 
artistic works, symbols, names, and images.”9 Intellectual property protection 
fosters human creativity, innovation and technological advancement by 
incentivizing individuals and companies to invest in the creation and development 
of their works.10 The most common types of intellectual property are patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks. 
A patent is “an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or 
a process that provides a new way of doing something, or offers a new technical 
solution to a problem.”11 Patents provide owners of inventions with protection from 
commercial use, distribution or sale of the patented invention without the owner’s 
consent.12 Copyright grants authors protection for their creations if such creations 
constitute literary works such as novels, films, artistic works, or music.13 Copyright 
protection allows creators to authorize or prohibit the reproduction, public 
performance, broadcast, translation, and adaptation of their works.14 
A trademark is a “work, phrase, symbol, or design . . . that identifies and 
distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from those of others.”15 
Trademarks may come in the form of “drawings, three-dimensional signs, or a 
combination of words, letters, and numbers.”16 Trademarks help consumers 
                                                          
9 Intellectual Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/intellectual%20property (last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (defining intellectual property as 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks). 
10 Id. 





15 Trademark, Copyright or Patent?, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 3, 
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/basics/trade_defin.jsp. 
16 What is Intellectual Property?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (June 3, 
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identify products based on their specific characteristics and quality.17 More 
importantly, protecting trademarks ensures that owners have the “exclusive right to 
authorize others to use [their marks] in return for payment.”18 
The international history of intellectual property protection dates as far back 
as the 19th century. The importance of intellectual property was first officially 
recognized in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris 
Convention”) in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) in 1886.19 As one of the first intellectual 
property treaties, the Paris Convention established a partnership among countries 
for the protection of intellectual property and remains in force today.20 Eleven 
countries signed the Paris Convention in 1883, and today it has 176 contracting 
member countries.21 It applies to intellectual property, including patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, and trade names.22 Its substantive provisions cover 
national treatment of intellectual property, rights of priority, and common rules that 
apply to all contracting countries.23 The Berne Convention, which focuses 
primarily on copyright protection, requires countries to recognize the copyright of 
authors from other member-countries in the same way that they recognize 
copyrights from their own citizens.24 The Berne Convention is still in force today 
with 168 contracting member countries.25 
                                                          
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 International Treaties and Conventions on Intellectual Property, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (last visited Dec. 1, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ 
www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf. 
20 Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (last visited 12 AM), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ 
paris/summary_paris.html. 
21 WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2. 
22 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 16. 
23 Id. 
24 Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (last visited Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html. 
25 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Works, Status on October 15, 2014, WORLD 
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Domestically, the “Patents and Copyright Clause” of the U.S. Constitution is 
the basis for federal copyright and patent laws.26 The Clause provides: “Congress 
shall have the power. . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”27 The Clause is “intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and 
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.”28 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), an agency of the 
Department of Commerce, governs intellectual property policy in the United 
States.29 At the cutting edge of technological progress and achievement, the 
USPTO’s mission is to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts by 
securing for limited times to investors the exclusive right to their respective 
discoveries.”30 The Federal Trademark Act of 1946, more commonly known as the 
Lanham Act, is the primary federal trademark statute in the United States.31 The 
Lanham Act “provides a national system of trademark registration and protects the 
owner of a federally registered mark against the use of similar marks if such use is 
likely to result in consumer confusion, or if the dilution of a famous mark is likely 
to occur.”32 It also imposes civil liability on any person who uses, in commerce, a 
registered trademark without the consent of the holder.33 
The case of Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. addressed the extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act.34 In the case, the American watch company brought 
suit against a Texas resident, Sydney Steele, for using the company’s U.S.-
registered trademark in Mexico.35 At issue was whether the United States District 
                                                          
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
27 Id. 
28 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
29 Intellectual Property Law and Policy, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/index.jsp. 
30 The USPTO: Who We Are, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/index.jsp. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
32 Id. 
33 Erika M. Brown, Extraterritorial Application of Trademark Law Under the Lanham Act: 
Recent Decisions from the Second Circuit, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 55, 58 (1998). 
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Court had jurisdiction to award Bulova Watch Co. relief against trademark 
infringement in another country.36 Steele had moved his watch business to Mexico 
City and discovered that the ‘Bulova’ trademark had not been registered in the 
country.37 Subsequently, he registered the ‘Bulova’ name in Mexico, and began 
selling watches under the ‘Bulova’ name.38 The District Court for the Western 
District of Texas held that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the 
case.39 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the District 
Court decisions, stating, “The Lanham Act . . . confers broad jurisdictional powers 
upon the courts of the United States.”40 Specifically, “[t]he statute’s expressed 
intent is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable 
the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce.”41 The Court based 
its holding on the internationally renowned reputation of Bulova Watch Co. and 
concluded that Steele’s counterfeit watches could adversely affect the company’s 
trade reputation in both domestic and international markets.42 As the only case the 
Supreme Court has heard regarding the extraterritorial application of the Lanham 
Act, Bulova shows the broad scope of the law and the desire of both Congress and 
courts to protect consumers from deceptive practices.43 
Establishing rights in intellectual property allows the creator of such patents, 
copyrights, or trademarks to benefit from their own work or investment in a 
creation.44 Protecting intellectual property rights has social, cultural, legal, and 
economic objectives. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
describes these objectives in three ways: 
First, the progress and well being of humanity rest on its 
capacity to create and invent new works in the areas of 
                                                          
36 Id. at 281. 
37 Id. at 285. 
38 Id. 
39 Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1952). 
40 Bulova, 344 U.S. at 283. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 286. 
43 Erika M. Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of United States Trademark Law: A Review of 
Recent Decisions Under the Lanham Act, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 863, 864 
(2006). 
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technology and culture. Second, the legal protection of 
new creations encourages the commitment of additional 
resources for further innovation. Third, the promotion 
and protection of intellectual property spurs economic 
growth, creates new jobs and industries, and enhances 
the quality and enjoyment of life.45 
The emphasis the WIPO places on protecting intellectual property rights combined 
with the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act shows the importance of 
intellectual property protection.46 It encourages innovation, and helps to drive 
economic growth and competitiveness.47 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS 
In 1965, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
allows a trustee, subject to court approval, “to assume or reject any executory 
contract . . . of the debtor.”48 While the Bankruptcy Code does not define 
“executory contract,” it is widely accepted that to be an executory contract, 
performance must be due on both sides.49 More specifically, courts rely on the 
definition proffered by noted bankruptcy scholar Professor Vern Countryman, 
which states that a contract is “executory” if the “obligations of both the bankrupt 
and the other party to the contract are so far underperformed that the failure of 
either to complete the performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other.”50 While rejecting an executory contract gives a 
financially distressed debtor an opportunity to be released from costly contractual 
obligations, it places the non-debtor party in a vulnerable position. 
Generally, “licensing agreements are considered to be executory contracts 
because both parties have continuing obligations to fulfill.”51 In applying § 365(a), 
                                                          
45 Id. 
46 Why is IP Important?, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CENTER (last visited Dec. 1, 2014, 
6:24 PM), http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/resources/why-is-ip-important/. 
47 Id. 
48 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
49 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 (1984). 
50 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 
(1973). 
51 Jeffrey M. Levinsohn, Intellectual Property Collaboration Stresses in Bankruptcy: Protecting 
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the Fourth Circuit has established a harsh precedent with respect to executory 
contracts and intellectual property licenses. In Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., Richmond Metal Finishers (“RMF”) entered into a 
contract granting Lubrizol a “nonexclusive license to utilize a metal coating 
process technology owned by RMF.”52 One year later, RMF filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy and sought to reject its contract with Lubrizol under § 365(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.53 The Fourth Circuit held that because there were continuing 
duties of performance due on both sides, the agreement between RMF and Lubrizol 
was an executory contract subject to the rejection provision under § 365(a).54 The 
Court found that RMF owed Lubrizol the continuing duties of notifying Lubrizol of 
further licensing and reducing their royalty rate.55 Conversely, Lubrizol owned 
RMF the continuing duty of “accounting for and paying royalties for the life of the 
agreement.”56 The ruling allowed RMF to “unilaterally reject its license 
agreement,” effectively discharging Lubrizol’s right to use the intellectual property 
in its business activities.57 
On the surface, the Lubrizol ruling appears clear cut. However, the court’s 
ruling exposed a major problem with § 365. Under Lubrizol, in the event of 
bankruptcy, a non-debtor licensee has no recourse if a debtor-licensor rejects its 
contract under § 365(a). “Because many businesses rely on licenses as a vital 
resource for survival, many businesses were faced with financial ruin due to the 
precedent which the Lubrizol case established.”58 Lubrizol urged the court to 
consider policy implications, including the serious burdens imposed on licensees, 
and the potential “chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at 
all with business in possible financial difficulty.”59 The court noted that it 
                                                                                                                                      
Silver, 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an obligation of a debtor to refrain from selling 
software packages under an exclusive licensing agreement made a contract executory). 
52 Lubrizol Enter., Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1046. 
55 Id. at 1045. 
56 Id. at 1046. 
57 David M. Jenkins, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licensing and 
the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 151 (1991). 
58 Id. at 151–52. 
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“understood” Lubrizol’s concerns, but concluded that they were not controlling in 
the case.60 Circuit Judge Phillips wrote, 
[U]nder bankruptcy law, such equitable considerations 
may not be indulged by courts in respect of the type of 
contract here at issue. Congress has plainly provided for 
the rejection of executory contracts, notwithstanding the 
obvious adverse consequences for contracting parties 
thereby made inevitable. Awareness by Congress of 
those consequences is indeed specifically reflected in the 
special treatment accorded to union members under 
collective bargaining contracts, and to lessees of real 
property. But no comparable special treatment is 
provided for technology licensees such as Lubrizol. 
They share the general hazards created by § 365 for all 
business entities dealing with potential bankrupts in the 
respects at issue here.61 
Under the business judgment rule,62 the decision by a bankruptcy trustee to 
assume or reject an executory contract is entitled to deference from the court, and 
will only be denied for bad faith.63 In the world of business and technology, 
intellectual property is often the most valuable asset that an entity holds. Its use and 
profitability make intellectual property an attractive asset to license to potential 
buyers. Post-Lubrizol, Congress noted, “The instability of Section 365 created for 
intellectual property licensing relations would force parties . . . to demand 
assignments. This demand for outright transfers of ownership of the intellectual 
property is wasteful and chilling to business innovators who would otherwise 
benefit from keeping their ownership rights.”64 
                                                          
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Under the business judgment rule, U.S. law provides that a court will defer to the judgment of 
the corporation if “in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action was in the best interest of the company.” 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
63 Levinsohn, supra note 51, at 474. 
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III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION ACT 
AND TRADEMARK PROTECTION 
To countermand the negative effects of the Lubrizol decision, Congress 
amended the Bankruptcy Code by enacting the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy 
Protection Act (“IPBPA”), adding § 365(n) in 1988. The IPBPA affords an IP 
licensee some protection during bankruptcy proceedings.65 Section 365(n) provides 
that if a debtor-licensor rejects a license agreement as an executory contract, the 
licensee may either (1) treat the license as terminated; or (2) retain the rights 
granted (except the right to compel specific performance) immediately before the 
bankruptcy case commenced.66 Ultimately, § 365(n) was enacted to “temper the 
traditional protections given to the estate and show partial deference to the rights of 
licensees or licensors under the intellectual property laws.”67 Section 365(n) 
provided a lifeboat to licensees by allowing them to continue using licensed 
intellectual property. However, the definition of “intellectual property” in the 
Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks, thus, they are excluded from the 
protection of the IPBPA amendment. 
Traditionally, trademarks have been included in the definition of intellectual 
property.68 Black’s Law Dictionary defines intellectual property as “a category of 
intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of human intellect. The 
category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights.”69 However, 
§ 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines intellectual property as “U.S. patents 
and copyrights, and trade secrets generally.”70 Some courts take the strict view that 
the plain language of § 365(n) excludes trademarks since they are not included in 
the definition of intellectual property. Thus, if a debtor-licensor rejects a trademark 
license, Lubrizol controls and the licensee is stripped of its right to use the mark. 
Other courts, looking to the legislative history of § 365(n), take the view that 
Congress intended courts to use their equitable powers to allow a licensee to 
continue using the trademark license while freeing the licensor of its obligations 
                                                          
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012). 
66 Id. 
67 Levinsohn, supra note 51, at 477. 
68 Intellectual Property, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
concise/intellectual%20property (last visited Jan. 9, 2014) (defining intellectual property as copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks). 
69 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009). 
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under the contract.71 Thus, the critical question is whether the trademark license 
agreement is executory. 
A. In re Exide Technologies: Trademark Licenses Are Non-Executory 
In Exide Technologies, the central issue was whether a trademark license was 
an executory contract subject to rejection under § 365(a).72 During its bankruptcy, 
Exide sought to reject a number of agreements with EnerSys Delaware, Inc., 
including a Trademark and Trade Name License Agreement (“Agreement”).73 
Under the Agreement, Exide granted EnerSys a “perpetual, exclusive, royalty-free 
license” to use the Exide trademark.74 The Bankruptcy Court found the Agreement 
to be an executory contract, terminating both Exide’s obligations under the 
Agreement and EnerSys’ right to use the license.75 However, the Third Circuit 
reversed, holding that the contract was not executory because EnerSys did not have 
a continuing material obligation under the agreement with Exide.76 The Court held 
that EnerSys’s ongoing, unperformed obligations did not outweigh the substantial 
performance rendered and the benefits received by EnerSys.77 
B. In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.: Trademark License is Executory 
In Interstate Bakeries, Lewis Brothers Bakeries (“LBB”), Inc. brought suit 
against Interstate Bakeries Corporation (“Interstate”) arguing that the trademark 
licensing agreement between them was not an executory contract.78 In 1996, 
Interstate entered into an agreement with LBB, granting it a “perpetual, royalty-
free, assignable, transferable, exclusive” license to use Interstate’s brands and 
trademarks, which included the Wonder Bread and Hostess brands.79 In 2004, 
Interstate filed a Chapter 11 voluntary bankruptcy.80 
                                                          
71 In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 669–71 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing 
alternative approaches to treatment of a trademark licensee). 
72 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010). 
73 Id. at 961. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 965. 
77 Id. at 963. 
78 In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2012). 
79 Id. at 1071–72. 
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The Bankruptcy Court held, and the District Court affirmed, that the 
agreement between Interstate and LBB was executory because material obligations 
remained for both parties.81 The court found that both Interstate and LBB 
maintained a number of obligations, specifically to maintain the quality and 
character of the goods.82 LBB relied on the Third Circuit’s finding in Exide that 
quality control was not a material obligation under the agreement, rendering its 
contract with Interstate non-executory.83 However, the Eighth Circuit distinguished 
the case by pointing out that in Exide, “the parties had not even contemplated or 
discussed any quality standards, so the court refused to import such an obligation 
into the agreement and thereafter conclude the obligation was material.”84 
Conversely, Interstate and LBB expressly stated in the license agreement that a 
breach of the quality control provision would constitute a material breach.85 As a 
result, the Eight Circuit found the agreement to be an executory contract subject to 
rejection under § 365(a).86 
Exide and Interstate Bakeries exposed a critical problem in the treatment of 
trademark licenses in bankruptcy proceedings. As seen in Interstate, trademark 
license agreements can be considered executory contracts.87 As long as there are 
continuing material obligations remaining on both sides, a debtor-licensor may 
reject the agreement under § 365(a). But, since trademarks are not included in the 
definition of “intellectual property” in the Code, trademark licensees lack recourse 
under Section 365(n) to retain any right to use or terminate the contract in the event 
the licensor rejects the contract. As such, courts continue to struggle with the 
holding of Lubrizol, and the rights of trademark licensees. 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. REJECTS LUBRIZOL’S 
HOLDING 
The Seventh Circuit came to a different conclusion regarding a trademark 
licensee’s right to continue using a licensed mark after rejection by a debtor-
licensor. In Sunbeam Products, Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. 
                                                          
81 Id. at 1071. 
82 Id. 
83 In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 2012). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 The Interstate Bakeries opinion was vacated June 18, 2013, and a rehearing en banc was 
granted. 
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(“Lakewood”) produced a number of consumer products, including box fans.88 In 
financial distress, Lakewood entered into an agreement with Chicago American 
Manufacturing (“CAM”) to manufacture the fans, and authorized CAM to place 
Lakewood trademarks on its box fans.89 As part of the agreement, Lakewood took 
orders from larger retail customers and CAM shipped the fans directly to the 
buyers.90 To guarantee payment in light of Lakewood’s financial distress, CAM 
negotiated for authorization to sell the fans for its own account in the event that 
Lakewood did not purchase them during the 2009 season.91 Three months later, 
Lakewood was forced to file for bankruptcy, and the court-appointed trustee opted 
to sell the business.92 Sunbeam Products bought Lakewood, including all of its 
patents and trademarks.93 To prevent CAM from selling fans branded with the 
Lakewood trademark in competition with Sunbeam, the company rejected the 
CAM licensing agreement under § 365(a).94 CAM continued to produce and sell 
the fans, and Sunbeam subsequently brought suit against the company.95 
The central issue in the case was the effect of Sunbeam’s rejection of the 
executory contract upon CAM’s right to sell the trademarked fans. The Seventh 
Circuit held on equitable grounds that CAM, “which invested substantial resources 
in making Lakewood-branded box fans,” was allowed to continue using the 
Lakewood trademark.96 Similar to Judge Ambro’s concurrence in Exide, the court 
looked to legislative history and reasoned that “the limited definition in § 101(35A) 
means that § 365(n) does not affect trademarks one way or the other. According to 
the Senate committee report on the bill that included § 365(n), the omission was 
designed to allow more time for study, not to approve Lubrizol.”97 The court took 
the view that it would be unfair to strip CAM of its rights under its licensing 
agreement simply because the definition of intellectual property is limited under 
the Bankruptcy Code. The court declined to follow Lubrizol on the grounds that it 
“confuses rejection with the use of an avoiding power . . . and devoted scant 
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attention to the question of whether rejection cancels a contract, worrying instead 
about the right way to identify executory contracts to which the rejection power 
applies.”98 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Implications of Circuit Split 
The legislative history of § 365(n) specifically states: 
[T]he bill does not address the rejection of executory 
trademark, trade name or service mark licenses by 
debtor-licensors. While such rejection is of concern 
because of the interpretation of section 365 by the 
Lubrizol court and others, such contracts raise issues 
beyond the scope of this legislation. In particular, 
trademark, trade name and service mark licensing 
relationships depend to a large extent on control of the 
quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. 
Since these matters could not be addressed without more 
extensive study, it was determined to postpone 
congressional action in this area and to allow the 
development of equitable treatment of this situation by 
bankruptcy courts.99 
The concurring opinion in Exide underscores the struggle of courts in the face 
of Lubrizol and the legislative history of § 365(n). Circuit Judge Ambro argued that 
the lower courts inappropriately decided that because trademarks are not 
“intellectual property” under the Bankruptcy Code, Lubrizol controls and licensees 
(such as EnerSys) lose their right to use the trademark for their products once the 
licensor rejects the agreement.100 While Judge Ambro conceded that Congress did 
not protect trademark licenses under § 365(n), she argued that courts should “use 
their ‘equitable powers’ to give debtor-licensor’s a fresh start without stripping 
licensees of their fairly procured trademark rights.”101 Moreover, Judge Ambro 
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99 S. REP. NO. 100-505 (1988). 
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noted that had the majority found the contract to be executory, she would have 
allowed EnerSys to keep its rights under the agreement. 
The current state of the law leaves courts with three options: (1) allow courts 
to use equitable discretion; (2) force licensees to assess their remedial rights under 
§ 365(g); or (3) follow the plain language of § 365(n). Each of these options poses 
significant risks. 
The option of subjecting the licensee to the equitable discretion of the 
bankruptcy court lacks the predictability and stability that a bright line rule could 
provide. The precedent could be on both sides, with only the courts’ “equitable 
judgment” to distinguish between cases. As Judge Easterbrook in Sunbeam noted, 
There are hundreds of bankruptcy judges, who have 
many different ideas about what is equitable in any 
given situation. Some may think that equity favors 
licensees’ reliance interests; others may believe that 
equity favors creditors, who can realize more of their 
claims if the debtor can terminate IP licenses.102 
Section 365(g) provides for the rights and remedies of licensee’s pre-petition 
for bankruptcy.103 Section 365(g) expressly states, “The rejection of an executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or 
lease.”104 This breach is ordinarily deemed to have occurred immediately before the 
date of the filing for bankruptcy.105 Some courts argue that if a licensor rejects a 
trademark agreement, the licensee should be directed to 365(g) for a remedy.106 
In In re Chipwich, Inc., the court grappled with the application of § 365(g) in 
the context of a trademark license controversy. Chipwich entered into an agreement 
with Farmland, granting the company an exclusive license in the U.S. “to produce, 
sell, distribute, sub-license, sub-contract, advertise and promote eggnog and 
flavored milk under the Chipwich trademark.”107 Approximately one year later, an 
                                                          
102 Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Manufacturing, 686 F.3d 372, 375–76 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
103 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (2012). 
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involuntary petition for bankruptcy was filed against Chipwich, and the company 
sought to reject its license agreement with Farmland.108 
The court held that Chipwich was authorized to reject the agreement, thereby 
releasing it from the contract with Farmland.109 The court recognized “the obvious 
adverse consequences for contracting parties thereby made inevitable” by § 365(a), 
but concluded that Farmland could treat the rejection as a breach of contract under 
§ 365(g).110 Here, the court reasoned “there was no showing that Farmland will be 
damaged disproportionately to any benefit derived by the debtor.”111 
Conversely, in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Petur USA entered into a 
20-year license with Petur of Canada granting the Canadian company the exclusive 
right to use, manufacture, assemble, and sell the inventions of Petur USA.112 
Because Petur Canada was created for the sole purpose of marketing Petur USA’s 
products in Canada, all of their business and income was based upon the license 
agreement.113 After Petur USA filed for bankruptcy, the company attempted to 
reject its executory contract with Petur Canada arguing that it was within the 
company’s business judgment and would aid in reorganization.114 The court 
concluded that the agreement was executory, but refused to allow Petur USA to 
reject the contract because it would do too much damage to Petur Canada.115 The 
court reasoned that “the destruction of the licensee’s business and the size of the 
resulting damage claim under § 365(g) would be ‘grossly disproportionate to any 
benefit derived.’”116 More specifically, “the court was concerned primarily with the 
severity of the harm to the non-debtor that would result if rejection were 
permitted.”117 
Both Chipwich and Petur show the dangers of utilizing § 365(g) as a remedy 
for licensees because its use hinges on how much of the licensee’s business is 
                                                          
108 Id. at 428–29. 
109 Id. at 431. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561, 562 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). 
113 Id. at 562. 
114 Id. at 563. 
115 Id. 
116 Jeffrey R. Seul, License and Franchise Agreements as Executory Contracts: A Proposed 
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based upon the executory contract in question. If the licensee’s business is not 
based largely on the executory contract, then damages may provide some monetary 
relief. However, if the licensee’s business is in fact based exclusively on the 
executory contract, damages will provide little in the way of relief since the 
licensee will be forced out of business. Because specific performance of the 
contract is not an available remedy, the licensee’s business is at the mercy of the 
court. 
B. Suggestion for the Future 
In his article Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My! Trademark 
Licensing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, David Jenkins calls for a six-
point revision to the Bankruptcy Code to “effectively resolve the problem of 
debtor-licensor rejection of executory trademark license agreements.”118 His 
proposal specifically calls for an amendment that would: (1) allow trademark 
licensees to retain their rights, (2) require courts to preliminarily assess trademark 
abandonment and quality control issues, (3) provide for continued delivery of 
materials under the license agreement, (4) guarantee the licensee’s “quiet 
enjoyment of the right to use the trademark,” (5) continue royalty payments to 
either the licensor or the bankruptcy estate, and (6) allow the licensee to continue 
its use of the trademark for the duration originally promised.119 
Jenkins’ proposed amendment is extensive, and focuses mostly on the courts 
preliminary assessment of abandonment and quality control issues, which were 
largely why Congress opted not to protect trademarks under § 365(n).120 In order 
for a trademark licensee to retain its rights under a license agreement, a debtor-
licensor must show that it will not abandon the trademark.121 Trademark 
abandonment occurs when the licensor intends not to use the mark in commerce 
after it has discontinued its use.122 It is important to make a requisite finding that 
the licensor will not abandon the trademark because if a licensee continues using an 
abandoned trademark, it risks deceiving the public as to the marks original source 
or guarantee of quality.123 
                                                          
118 Jenkins, supra note 57, at 165. 
119 Id. at 165–66. 
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At the same time, a licensee must maintain the quality control procedures 
agreed to in the original licensing agreement.124 Quality control is “the most 
important and complex aspect” of Jenkins’ proposed amendment.125 The measures 
for quality control are important because they ensure that the quality of the 
trademark will not be diminished and that its continued use will not deceive the 
public. Jenkins suggests that bankruptcy courts should find that licensee quality 
control measures are adequate if they are reasonably effective to ensure proper 
maintenance of the quality of the trademark.126 He suggests that informal control 
requirements such as unannounced inspections of the licensee’s facilities or 
submitting samples and inspection reports to the licensor are reasonably effective 
measures that the court could impose upon licensees.127 
However, part of the hesitancy of Congress to include trademarks under 
§ 365(n) was the issue of quality control and fear that imposing such standards on 
licensees would undercut the Lanham Act’s quality control requirement.128 Section 
5 of the Lanham Act provides: 
When a registered mark or a mark sought to be 
registered is or may be used legitimately by related 
companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the 
registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall 
not affect the validity of such mark or of its registration, 
provided such mark is not used in such a manner as to 
deceive the public.129 
Under the Lanham Act, trademark owners already have a duty to exercise quality 
control over its mark. The amendment suggested by Jenkins would require courts 
to impose stricter quality control standards than are required under the Act. 
From a fairness perspective, amending § 365(n) would place trademarks on 
equal footing with other forms of intellectual property covered under the statute. It 
would give trademark licensees the option to retain their rights under a license 
                                                          
124 Id. at 166. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 170. 
128 William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Control, 70 
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agreement. However, the original draft of the IPBPA contained a proposal for 
protecting trademarks.130 The proposal provided, in pertinent part, that the trustee 
would not be allowed to interfere with the licensee’s rights.131 Specifically, in the 
case of trademarks, the proposal permitted existing licensees to continue the use 
and enjoyment of the mark so long as they maintained the quality control standards. 
Congress dropped this proposal from the amendment for three primary 
reasons: (1) a primary concern for technological development, (2) issues regarding 
quality control, and (3) the possibility for court-created equitable remedies.132 First, 
Congress was more troubled by the technological advancements of other forms of 
intellectual property.133 As noted earlier, it was also concerned with the uniqueness 
of trademarks and the necessary quality control requirements.134 Lastly, Congress 
only sought to “postpone” action on trademark protection in order to allow 
bankruptcy courts to generate equitable remedies.135 However, the rationale behind 
each of these reasons is weak and no longer valid. 
First, intellectual property historically encompasses trademarks, which 
promote technological advancement and economic growth just as much as other 
forms of intellectual property. By their very nature, trademarks generate 
familiarity, trust, and certainty of a brand, which in turn facilitates technological 
investment and advancement.136 Trademarks have been shown to be useful 
complements to other forms of IP protection, and positively linked with innovative 
activity and growth in companies that use them.137 Specifically, trademarks 
contribute substantially to a company’s intangible assets and market value.138 A 
2010 survey by Interbrand found that the value of the IP in the brand recognition 
alone for each of the top ten brands worldwide exceeded $25 billion.139 Such 
staggering numbers show the value in strong trademark protection. 
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Second, the Lanham Act already imposes quality control standards upon 
trademark licensees.140 The Lanham Act requires licensors to provide quality 
control, and courts have become increasingly lenient in the standards for sufficient 
quality control.141 Further, licensees engage in their own form of quality control 
because they invest substantial resources into building and maintaining the quality 
of the mark.142 From a practical perspective, the burden on licensors to maintain 
quality control standards is not so burdensome. Thus, using quality control 
concerns as a rationale for not protecting non-debtor licensees is senseless. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the cases discussed herein highlights the continuing risks of relying 
on a trademark license rather than outright ownership of a trademark. Congress’ 
rationale for excluding trademarks from § 365(n) has proven to be unworkable, 
outdated, and unjustifiable. The circuit split shows that courts and businesses alike 
need direction and finality on this issue. Moreover, the Supreme Court denied 
review of Sunbeam leaving the split in place for now. Congress must address the 
problems caused by the unequal treatment of trademarks in bankruptcy proceedings 
by amending the IPBPA to include trademarks. From both a policy and fairness 
perspective, the disparate treatment of trademarks as a traditional class of 
intellectual property can no longer be sustained. 
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